By Benedetta Berti, PhD, Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and Council Member, Council on Global Competition and Innovation – CGCI
NATO’s latest strategy (the 2022 ‘’Strategic Concept”) identifies “strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks” as the defining features of the Alliance’s strategic environment. It stresses that NATO must prepare for a time of “non-peace”, permanent emergency and “volatility by design.”
That assessment remains valid in 2026. Simultaneous conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East underscore a worrisome lowering of the threshold for the use of armed force. They also reinforce the reality that the impact of regional shocks in key theatres of strategic competition, from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, is unlikely to remain contained.
At the same time, we see a continued “weaponization of everything”: state and non-state actors deliberately employ both kinetic and non-kinetic tools—from energy blackmail to economic coercion, and from sabotage of critical infrastructure to persistent cyber-attacks—as instruments of strategic competition.
NATO’s Adaptation
Against this backdrop, NATO has been undergoing a profound shift to ensure the Alliance remains effective at a time when credible deterrence and defense are once again central to Allied security.
NATO’s first priority has been to rebuild a viable military instrument of powerafter decades in which most Allies underspent and under-invested in defense, particularly in Europe. Concretely, this means investing more, with NATO countries aiming to spend 5% of GDP on defense by 2035: 3.5% of GDP on core defense expenditures and an additional 1.5% on investments in resilience writ large. Increased defense spending is intended to restore meaningful Allied defense production capacity across the Atlantic. A strong and innovative defense industrial base, capable of out-producing and out-innovating potential adversaries and competitors, is now understood as an essential component of effective deterrence.
Retaining that effectiveness in a world of simultaneous cross-theaters threats and multiple near-peer competitors requires NATO to rebalance Allied contributions to European security. In practice, this means ensuring that European NATO countries and Canada progressively assume primary responsibility for the conventional deterrence and defense of Europe. This process of “burden-shifting” is necessary not only to ensure the Alliance’s operational effectiveness, but also to maintain political cohesion and preserve a strong transatlantic bond between Europe and North America.
Deterrence and defense at a time of geopolitical competition, however, cannot rest solely on strong militaries. NATO and its member states have therefore recognized the need to build a whole-of-society culture of defense and preparedness. This requires strengthening the resilience of the societal and economic enablers of defense—the institutions, industries, infrastructure, and assets on which effective defense relies. From civilian satellites to 5G networks, and from transportation infrastructure to defense-critical supply chains, credible deterrence depends on mitigating vulnerabilities and strategic dependencies. It equally depends on the ability of defense-critical sectors to withstand hybrid attacks and continue operating effectively in times of crisis, conflict or prolonged disruption.
Implications for Investors
These shifts in the strategic environment, and NATO’s adaptation to this “new normal” have direct implications for private capital and investor communities in NATO countries and beyond.
Persistent geopolitical competition and instability mean it is no longer possible to neatly compartmentalize economic and national security policy. “Security by design” will increasingly have to be priced into capital allocation decisions, particularly in sectors like energy infrastructure, critical technologies, and defense‑adjacent capabilities. Geopolitics and geoeconomics will continue to shape market dynamics, and investors will have to bring geopolitical analysis into the boardroom to make robust, long-term investment choices.
At the same time, the push to strengthen investment in defense and security across the NATO Alliance also brings significant opportunity. The “defense dividend” can generate tangible opportunities for economic growth and re-industrialization. It can accelerate innovation, enhance competitiveness, and support high-quality job creation. In the coming years, there will be significant opportunities for the private sector to both contribute to and benefit from national-security investments in areas like critical infrastructure, defense-critical supply chains, and the expansion of the defense industrial base.
There will be a first-mover advantage for investors who deliberately position themselves at the forefront of de‑risking investment in critical infrastructure, supporting the development of defense-critical dual‑use technologies, and financing sustaining defense industrial expansion. In this context, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and institutions such as the Council on Global Competition and Innovation – CGCI help ensure that the political will, policy instruments, and private‑sector engagement needed to underpin Allied deterrence and resilience are not only articulated, but implemented and sustained over time.



